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The Supreme Court's decision in Vaca v. Sipes 1 is like a giant
squid. It has a number of procedural tentacles, any one of which
may be more than we can master, but with all of which we must
ultimately contend. There is always the danger that we shall be
so preoccupied with avoiding the entwining arms, that we shall
never see the head from which the tentacles grow, and that the
whole problem will escape in a cloud of ink. I do not propose now
to wrestle the squid or cut through the procedural tentacles; I will
leave that to others 2 or to another time. I propose instead to probe
* This Article is a revision of a paper presented at the 1974 annual meeting of
the National Academy of Arbitrators. The earlier paper was published in NATIONAL
AcADEmy oF ARBnmATORS, ARBrnAnoiq-1974 PROCEEDnGS, 27TH ANNuAl. MEETNG
14 (1975). @ Copyright 1975 by Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
f Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1939, J.D. 1942,
University of Illinois; J.S.D. 1952, Columbia University; LL.D. 1966, University of
Louvain, Belgium. Member, New York Bar. Mr. Summers is in Europe for the
academic year 1977-78 on a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.
1386 U.S. 171 (1967).
2 E.g., Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary
Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUrFoL.
U. L. REv. 1096 (1974); Note, Statute of Limitations Governing Fair Representation
Action Against Union When Brought Against Employer, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 418
(1976); Comment, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual Employee,
51 TEE. L. REv. 1179 (1973); Comment, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law
Preemption and Individual Rights, 51 TEx. L. RBv. 1037 (1973); Comment,
Employee Challenges to Arbitral Awards: A Model for Protecting Individual Rights
Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1310 (1977);
Comment, Fair Representation and Breach of Contract in Section 301 Employee-
Union Suits: Who's Watching the Back Door?, 122 U. PA. L. JEv. 714 (1974).
See also Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CArI". L. REv. 663 (1973).
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only the substantive head and nerve center-the size and shape of
the substantive duty of fair representation.
The central substantive proposition of Vaca v. Sipes can be
simply stated: where the collective agreement gives the union ex-
clusive control over the grievance procedure and arbitration, the
individual employee's rights under the collective agreement are
limited by the union's duty of fair representation. The employee
can sue the employer for breach of his rights under the collective
agreement only after first showing that the union has acted unfairly
in refusing to process his grievance to arbitration; 3 and the em-
ployee can sue the union for refusing to process his grievance only
upon showing that the union has acted unfairly. The liability of
the employer and the liability of the union are both dependent on
the union's violation of its duty of fair representation.
Although the substantive proposition can be simply stated, its
practical content is not easily defined; the term "fair" provides only
the starting point, not the ending point of inquiry. The crucial and
difficult question is what standards or guides are to be used in
determining whether the union's handling of the grievance has been
"fair." It is this question that I want to probe.
4
I. RooTs OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR REPRESENTATION
The right to fair representation had its origin in the cases of
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad 5 and Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen,, decided in 1944. In those cases the
Court invalidated seniority clauses, negotiated by the union and
3 Vaca addresses the issue of the vindication of an individual employee's con-
tractual rights prior to arbitration. It makes a showing that the union breached its
duty of fair representation owed to the employee a prerequisite to the employee's pur-
suing contractual remedy against the employer on his own. For a discussion of why
an employee's challenge of an unfavorable arbitral award should not be similarly con-
ditioned upon a showing of unfair representation on the part of the union, see
Comment, Employee Challenges to Arbitral Awards: A Model for Protecting Indi-
vidual Rights Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1310
(1977).
4 For other attempts to give some content to the standard of "fairness," see
Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 Sup.
CT. REv. 81; Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations:
Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HAS=nGs L.J. 391
(1964); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsi-
bility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958); Comment, The Duty of Fair
Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REv. 1119 (1973).
5 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
6 323 U.S. 210 (1944). Steele and Tunstall arose under the Railway Labor Act,
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970). The duty of fair representation was later held appli-
cable under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970). Syres v.
Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1953).
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the employer, that had the purpose and effect of putting Negroes
at the bottom of the seniority list. In so doing, the Court artic-
ulated the basic principle that a union owes a duty to "act fairly"
and to "protect equally" all whom it represents. This duty has two
separate tap roots.
First, a union vested with statutory authority as the exclusive
representative, must have a statutory duty, much like that of a
governmental body, to represent fairly those governed by its agree--
ments. In the words of the Court, the statute imposes on the union
in negotiating a collective agreement "at least as exacting a duty to
protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Con-
stitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the
interests of those for whom it legislates." 7
Second, a union that acts as bargaining representative of em-
ployees owes to the employees it represents the duty owed by an
agent to its principal, and the duty owed by a fiduciary to its ben-
eficiary. In the words of the Court: "[flit is a principle of general
application that the exercise of granted power to act in behalf of
others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise
the power in their interest and their behalf." 8 The union "chosen
to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the majority as
well as the minority, and it is to act for and not against those whom
it represents." 9
The size and shape of the duty growing from these roots was
not described in these early cases beyond some sketchy outlines
colored with value-laden adjectives. In negotiating an agreement,
the union need not treat all employees alike, but can make "[v]aria-
tions in the terms of the contract based on differences relevant to
the authorized purposes of the contract," 10 such as seniority, type
of work performed, or skill. But, said the Court, the union cannot
make "discriminations not based on such relevant differences," and
"discriminations based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and
invidious." 11
Later cases have made explicit what was implicit in the roots
of the duty. Variations based on differences other than race may
be equally irrelevant and, therefore, prohibited. Discrimination
may be found in different treatment on dismissals, granting of vaca-
7Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. at 202.
81d.
91d. (footnotes omitted).
10 Id. 203.
11 Id. See also Marchione, A Case for Individual Rights Under Collective
Agreements, 27 LAB. L.J. 738 (1976).
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tions, or rates of pay, as well as manipulation of seniority rights.12
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that negotiating agreements
requires compromises and adjustments of varied interests and
groups. Therefore, "[a] wide range of reasonableness must be al-
lowed . . . subject always to complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of [the union's] discretion." 13
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NEGOTIATION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
These are the broad standards to be applied in measuring the
union's duty in the negotiation of an agreement and the employee's
rights that arise as a function of the union's negotiating duty. We
are concerned here, however, with the standard to be applied in
the administration of an agreement after it has been negotiated.
The standards are not the same, because the statutory policy, the
status of the union, and the practical needs of collective bargaining
are quite different in contract administration.14
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act clearly dis-
tinguishes between the roles of a union in negotiating and in ad-
12 See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (Gaynor
News); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
323 U.S. 248 (1944).
13 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
14 The difference between contract negotiation and contract administration, as
these terms are used here, is one defined, in the first instance, in terms of time.
Negotiation precedes the making of the collective agreement and is directed toward
writing and signing the document. Administration follows the making of the collec-
tive agreement and is directed toward applying and enforcing its terms. The differ-
ence between negotiation and administration is also institutional and procedural.
The union committees and officials responsible for negotiating the agreement are
specially designated for that purpose and are often different from the shop stewards
and grievance committees responsible for administering the agreement. The pro-
cedures for determining the demands to be made in negotiations, for weighing what
issues are to be given priority, and for deciding whether a proposed contract shall
be ratified are normally quite different from the procedures for deciding what
grievances are to be filed and how they shall be settled. See generally H. DAvEY,
CoNT1mmoRAnY Comr xrrw BARGAnnNG (3d ed. 1972).
Contract administration is more than a mechanical process, for it includes sub-
stantial elements of bargaining. Negotiations commonly leave the contract incom-
plete, with gaps to be filled, ambiguities to be resolved, and unforeseen situations to
be met. The grievance procedure and arbitration perform the necessary function of
contract completion. In this respect contract administration performs the same
function as negotiation. There is, however, a difference in the scope of decisions
contemplated in the two processes. The very purpose of negotiation is to change
the provisions in the agreements, and it is expected that existing provisions may be
modified or excised, new provisions may be added, and the whole system of rules
may be extensively revised. The purpose of contract administration, in contrast, is
to enforce and apply the existing provisions, and grievance settlements are expected
to be made within the framework and consistent with the system of governing rules.
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ministering an agreement. 15 Section 9(a) vests the majority union
with exclusive authority to negotiate an agreement. 16 The proviso
to section 9(a), however, explicitly states that the statute does not
give the union exclusive authority in presenting and settling
grievances. The statute mandates that the employer must deal
exclusively with the union in making an agreement, but the statute
expressly permits the employer to adjust grievances with individual
employees.' 7 The only limitations on the employer in adjusting
grievances with the individual employee are that the adjustment not
be "inconsistent with the terms" of the collective agreement, and
that the union be "given opportunity to be present at such adjust-
ment." Thus, under the statute, the union only has limited rights
in the processing and settling of grievances: the rights to be present
when grievances are adjusted and to insist that adjustments not be
inconsistent with the agreement.
Congress drew a definite line between the negotiation and ad-
ministration of collective agreements. The explicit judgment of
Congress, articulated in section 9(a), was that the union needed
exclusive power to negotiate agreements, but did not need exclusive
power to settle grievances arising under the agreements. Indeed,
the words of section 9(a), on their face, indicate a congressional
policy that the union should not have exclusive control over griev-
ances, for the words are "any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
15 Section 9(a), in its entirety, states:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided,
That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right
at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such
grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further,
That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present
at such adjustment. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159
(1970).
16 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). For an historical study of
the majority rule principle in law and practice, see Schreiber, The Origin of the
Majority Rule and the Simultaneous Development of Institutions to Protect the
Minority: A Chapter in Early American Labor Law, 25 Rrcrmas L. REv. 237 (1971).
See also Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 CoLurm. L. RFv. 556
(1945).
'7 Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945). For the legislative
development of the proviso, see Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance
Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLum. L. REV. 731 (1950); Summers, indi-
vidual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 362
(1962).
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their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative." Is
Despite the proviso of section 9(a), unions assert under most
collective agreements the exclusive power to process and settle
grievances and to carry cases to arbitration.19 This power of the
union to control the grievance procedure, however, does not derive
from the statute but from the collective agreement. The union's
exclusive control over the administration of the agreement is
granted by the employer, not by Congress; the employers, by con-
tract, have given unions the status Congress refused to give by
statute.
By virtue of this contractually derived status as exclusive en-
forcer of the collective agreement, the union assumes a heavy re-
sponsibility to exercise its control on behalf of, rather than against
the individual employee. The collective agreement creates rights
in the individual employee which are enforceable under section
301.20 In the absence of a union controlled grievance procedure,
the individual can sue and enforce his rights in his own behalf.21
The effect of the contractual provision giving the union exclusive
control over the grievance procedure is to deprive the individual
of his ability to enforce the contract on his own behalf. The union,
having deprived the individual of his ability to enforce his rights,
has a special obligation to act on his behalf.
18 This reading of section 9(a) has some support in the legislative history. The
Taft-Hartley Act added the words "and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargaining contract or agreement then in
effect." Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1970). Congress was concerned with the relative rights of the individual and the
union and sought to secure the individual employee's rights under the collective
agreement. See Dunau, supra note 17; Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance
-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 Prrr. L. REv. 35 (1949); Summers, supra note 17, at
376-85. For a comprehensive and scholarly historical study of the majority rule
principle in law and practice, see Schreiber, supra note 16.
Professor Cox has effectively argued that, despite the words used, Congress did
not intend that the individual should have a "right" to present grievances, but only
that the employer should have a "privilege" to listen. Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 HAnv. L. REv. 601 (1956). He argued that the individual's right
was to fair representation in the grievance procedure, the position adopted by the
Court in Vaca v. Sipes.
19 See [1976] 2 CorL. BARG. NEGoTATIONS & CoNT. (BNA) 55:1-21. Pro-
fessor Feller has argued that this exclusive control is essential to the collective
agreement. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CALIF. L. REv. 663 (1973).
2029 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
21 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n., 371 U.S. 195 (1962). The Court in Vaca
was explicit: "If a grievance and arbitration procedure is included in the contract,
but the parties do not intend it to be an exclusive remedy, then a suit for breach of
contract will normally be heard even though such procedures have not been ex-
hausted." 386 U.S. at 184 n.9 (citations omitted).
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In practical terms, the union's need for flexibility in negotiating
collective agreements is of a different dimension than its need for
flexibility in interpreting and applying collective agreements. The
collective agreement is a complex package of provisions and ben-
efits. In negotiating an agreement, the union must accommodate
the overlapping and competing demands of varied interest groups,
surrendering or compromising some demands to achieve others.
Relative advantages and disadvantages of different proposals to the
various groups must be weighed both singly and in combination.
The package put together represents not only a bilateral compromise
between the union and the employer, but also a multilateral com-
promise among interest groups within the union. To negotiate
such a package, the union needs, as the Court said in Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffrman, a "wide range of reasonableness." 22
In contrast, settlement of disputes as to the meaning and ap-
plication of the collective agreement requires a much narrower
range of flexibility. If the meaning of the contract and the facts
are clear, then all that is required is to carry out the compromise
made when the contract was negotiated. If the contract is ambig-
uous, then the parties need the flexibility to complete the com-
promise within the range of reasonable meanings of the agreement.
If the facts are unclear, then the parties need no more freedom
than to agree on a reasonable determination of the facts.
These differences between contract negotiation and contract
administration as reflected in the statutory policy, the status of the
union, and the practical needs of the parties, clearly call for different
standards for measuring the duty of fair representation. Returning
to the roots of the duty, when a union negotiates a contract it is
acting like a legislature establishing rules, and like a legislature it
is allowed a wide range of reasonableness; but when a union ad-
ministers a contract it is acting more as an administrative agency
enforcing and applying legislation, and it must act within the
boundaries of established rules. If the union is conceived of as an
agent or fiduciary, the authority granted to an agent to negotiate a
contract is generally broader, with more discretion, than the author-
ity granted to enforce or apply a contract after it has been made.
The duty of fair representation in the administration of the agree-
ment requires observance and protection of the rights created by
the agreement.
This brings us to the point of inquiring more specifically what
is the standard for measuring the union's duty of fair representation
22345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
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in processing grievances. The inquiry is divided into two major
parts: first, a close study of Supreme Court opinions for the general
guides the Court has provided; and second, an application of those
general guides to sample cases with a view toward drawing out more
specific standards for judging what is fair and what is unfair in
grievance handling. No promise is held out that this will lead us to
a comprehensive definition of the duty of fair representation; the
most that can be hoped is that we shall move a step or two along
the road toward that goal.
III. GENERAL GuiDEs FROM THE SUPREME COURT
The only guides provided by the Supreme Court for measuring
the union's duty of fair representation in contract administration
are those articulated or applied in Humphrey v. Moore,23 Vaca v.
Sipes,24 and Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.2 5 Although
amorphous and incomplete, those guides provide a sense of direction
and suggest some inchoate standards to be applied in concrete
areas.
26
In Humphrey v. Moore, one trucking company absorbed the
operations of a second company. The local union, which repre-
sented employees of both companies, recommended that the two
seniority lists be dovetailed 27 and this recommendation was adopted
by the Joint Conference Committee. When employees of the first
company who were laid off as a result of this dovetailing charged
that they had not been fairly represented, the Court, in rejecting
this claim, focused on four points. First, the section of the col-
lective agreement relied upon by the Joint Committee in making its
decision "reasonably meant what the Joint Committee said or
23 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
24386 U.S. 171 (1967).
25 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
26 For other efforts to develop standards of the duty of fair representation in
grievance administration, see Feller, supra note 19; Levy, The Collective Bargaining
Agreement as a Limitation on Union Control of Employee Grievances, 118 U. PA.
L. REv. 1036 (1970); Lewis, supra note 4; Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Dis-
charged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. Cn. L. Rnv. 55 (1972);
Comment, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L.
REv. 1119 (1973); Comment, Post-Vaca Standards of the Union's Duty of Fair
Representation: Consolidating Bargaining Units, 19 VILL. L. REv. 885 (1974).
27 The dovetailing of the seniority lists of the absorbing and absorbed com-
panies was to result in a master seniority schedule wherein the seniority of any given
employee was to be measured from his date of employment with either company.
375 U.S. at 339. Because the absorbed company was older than the absorbing
company and consequently had employed its employees generally for longer periods,
the sandwiching of the seniority lists meant that the employees of the absorbing
company had to be laid off first. Id.
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assumed it meant." 28 Second, the decision to dovetail "was neither
unique nor arbitrary," but was a "familiar and frequently equitable
solution" in such cases. 29 Third, the local union was free to take a
"good faith position . . . supporting the position of one group of
employees against that of another," for it should not "be neutralized
when the issue is chiefly between two sets of employees." 30 Finally,
the disfavored employees were not deprived of a fair hearing, for
they had notice of the hearing, and three stewards representing
them were present at the hearing and were given every opportunity
to state their position. With these four elements present, the union
fulfilled its duty of fair representation. Whether something less
would have met the minimum standard, we cannot know, but these
four elements are considered by the Court -as relevant in determin-
ing the standard.
In Vaca v. Sipes,31 an employee, Owens, who had been on sick
leave, was denied reinstatement because of his heart condition. The
Court emphasized that the union had pressed the grievance through
the grievance procedure, attempted to obtain evidence to support
Owen's case, attempted to secure less strenuous work for him, and
tried to help him be rehabilitated. Only after all these efforts did
the union conclude that arbitration would be fruitless and dis-
missed the grievance. Beyond holding that this diligence in
processing Owen's grievance met the standard of fair representation,
the Court, by its choice of language and its analysis, provided addi-
tional guides as to the measure of that duty.
The Court in Vaca carefully and deliberately selected the terms
for describing the duty, and in doing so distinguished between the
standards to be used in contract negotiation and contract adminis-
tration. Counsel for the union urged that the union's duty should
be limited to acting in "complete good faith and honesty," the
words used in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman to describe the union's
duty in negotiating an agreement. 2 The Court, however, rejected
these words as an inadequate description of the duty, in effect saying
that in the settlement of grievances, "complete good faith and
honesty" was not enough.
28 Id. 345.
29 Id. 347.
30 Id. 349.
31386 U.S. 171 (1967).
32 Feller, Vaca v. Sipes: One Year Later, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YoRK UNI-
vinsrry TwENTY-FusT ANNumA CONFErENCE ON LABoR 141, 167 (T. Christensen
ed. 1968).
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In contrast, the Court defined the duty in broader terms of
"wrongfulness;" the individual could sue on the basis of the union's
"wrongful refusal to process the grievance." 33 Wrongfulness was
elaborated by three principle adjectives, used in the alternative-
"arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." 34 Repeated emphasis
was given to the word "arbitrary," which union counsel had urged
the Court not to add to the standard stated in Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman.35 Wrongfulness was further elaborated by the Court to
include ignoring a meritorious grievance or processing it in a per-
functory manner. Thus, the Court declared: "[A] union must, in
good faith and in a nonarbitrary manner, make decisions as to the
merits of particular grievances .... [T]he Union might well have
breached its duty had it ignored Owens' complaint or had it
processed the grievance in a perfunctory manner." 3
These carefully selected terms for describing the duty were
more than elusive adjectives to create a mood; they were used to
narrow the polar positions presented by arguments to the Court
and to bring the standard of fair representation into clearer focus.
Rejecting the polar extremes, the Court emphasized on the one
hand that the individual employee has no "absolute right to have
his grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions of the
applicable collective bargaining agreement," 87 for if he could, "the
settlement machinery provided by the contract would be substan-
tially undermined." as On the other hand, the Court emphasized
that the union's exclusive control over grievance procedures did not
33 386 U.S. at 185 (emphasis in original).
341d. 190.
35 Feller, supra note 32. The courts were slow in recognizing that Vaca an-
nounced a different standard in processing grievances. See Jackson v. TWA, Inc.,
457 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1972); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse,
AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Dill v.
Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971).
In 1972, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, having read Professor Feller's
article, supra note 32, pointed out that "repeated references in Vaca to 'arbitrary'
union conduct reflected a calculated broadening, of the fair representation standard."
Griffin v. U.A.W., 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972). Other courts of appeals have
now explicitly recognized that the union's duty "to avoid arbitrary conduct" is a
distinct obligation from its duty to treat all factions "without hostility or discrimina-
tion," and its duty to exercise its discretion in "complete good faith." See Kesner v.
NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983 (1976); Ruzicka v.
General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Beriault v. Local 40, ILWU,
501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974); Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102 (5th
Cir. 1973).
36 386 U.S. at 194 (footnote omitted).
37 id. 191.
38 Id.
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carry with it "unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of
all remedies for breach of contract." 31
In narrowing the polar positions of the parties, the Court stated
that the union did not breach its duty "merely because it settled
the grievance short of arbitration." 40 The Court approved the
union's desire to assure that "frivolous grievances are ended prior
to the most costly and time-consuming step in the grievance pro-
cedures." 41 The union does not fulfill its duty, however, merely
by refraining from "patently wrongful conduct such as racial dis-
crimination or personal hostility." 42  "[A] union must, in good
faith and in a nonarbitrary manner, make decisions as to the merits
of particular grievances."43
Proof of violation of the duty of fair representation requires
more than a showing that the evidence supports the individual's
claim that he has been wrongfully discharged; 44 the union's de-
cision that a particular grievance "lacks sufficient merit to justify
arbitration" does not become a breach of duty simply "because a
judge or jury later found the grievance meritorious." 45 But, said
the Court, "a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious griev-
ance or process it in perfunctory fashion." 46
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.47 a truckdriver was dis-
charged for allegedly falsifying a motel receipt, and this discharge
was upheld by a Joint Conference Committee. He claimed that
had the union adequately investigated it would have discovered
that the falsification was made by the motel clerk, and with this
evidence obtained his reinstatement. Although the only issue
before the Court was whether the employer could be sued for
'wrongful discharge when the union had failed to produce evidence
at the Joint Conference Committee hearing, the Court restated and
extended the standards articulated in Vaca. The "duty of fair
representation has served as a 'bulwark to prevent arbitrary union
conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress
by the provisions of federal labor law.' "48 Although the duty does
39Id. 186.
40 Id. 192.
41Id. 191.
42 Id. 190.
43 Id. 194.
44 1d, 192-93.
45 Id.
46Id. 191.
47424 U.S. 554 (1976).
48 Id. 564.
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not require "pressing the employee's case to the last step of the
grievance process," it does require that a union not "'arbitrarily
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory
fashion.' 49 Congress, in putting its blessing on private dispute
settlement anticipated that "the contractual machinery would op-
erate within some minimum levels of integrity." 50 If the union
fails in its duty in presenting the case at arbitration, the individual
employee is not bound by the award. Otherwise, "[w]rongfully
discharged employees would be left without jobs and without a
fair opportunity to secure an adequate remedy." 51
Although the Court's opinions in these three cases do not define
the standard of the union's duty of fair representation, they do
reject the polar extremes and mark some outer boundaries, thereby
providing some guides as to the inner and outer limits of the duty.
Those limits are farther narrowed, and the standard is given sub-
stantive content by four interlacing policies or values which run
through all of the Court's opinions from Humphrey to Hines.
First, the legally enforceable contractual rights that individual
employees acquire under collective agreements are valuable per-
sonal rights and the union's ability to prevent employees from
enforcing those rights should be limited. In the words of the
Court in Vaca, "We cannot believe that Congress, in conferring
upon employers and unions the power to establish exclusive griev-
ance procedures, intended to confer upon unions such unlimited
discretion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach
of contract." 52
Second, arbitration should not be overburdened with frivolous
grievances by allowing an individual employee unilaterally to invoke
arbitration or to compel the union to take grievances to arbitration
regardless of their merit. The union must be free to sift out wholly
frivolous grievances that would only clog the grievance process and
must have the power to settle the majority of grievances short of the
costlier and more time consuming steps of arbitration.
491d. 569.
50 Id. 571.
51 Id. The Court treated the decision of the Joint Conference Committee as an
arbitration award. Because of the bilateral character of the Committee and the na-
ture of its operation, its determination should be viewed as a grievance settlement
agreed upon by the parties. The characterization of the Committee, however, makes
no difference in this case, for the union owes at least as much duty to investigate
before settling as before arbitrating.
52 386 U.S. at 186.
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Third, the union, as "statutory agent and as coauthor of the
bargaining agreement" should be able to isolate the "major problem
areas in the interpretation of the collective bargaining contract" 53
and resolve those problems. Where bargaining has left ambiguities
or gaps in the agreement, the union must be able to resolve those
ambiguities or fill those gaps by settlement of grievances with the
employer.
Fourth, there should be assurance that in settling disputes
under collective agreements, "similar complaints will be treated
consistently." 54 A problem of interpretation, once settled by the
parties in one case should settle the problem in all other cases.
Individual grievants should not be subject to "the vagaries of inde-
pendent and unsystematic negotiation." 6r
IV. APPLICATION OF SUPREME COURT GumEs:
SEVEN SAMPLE CASES 56
The general guides drawn from the Supreme Court opinions
are rich in adjectives and illuminated by metaphors that articulate
values and give a sense of direction. The central core of policies
is made explicit, and some of the outer boundaries are marked.
The general guides acquire useful content, however, only when we
try to apply them to concrete fact situations. Only as we confront
specific cases and ask ourselves whether the union has fairly repre-
sented the grievants can we make the guides more explicit.
Therefore, I would like to examine the application of these
guides to seven hypothetical, though not so hypothetical, cases and
project the results that the guides require. The hope is that from
these results we may evolve and articulate more specific standards
for measuring whether the union has fulfilled its fiduciary duty to
the individual employee in processing and settling his grievance.
A. The Case of the Paper Promise
The truck drivers of a metropolitan cartage company sue for
underpayment of hourly rates, overtime, and vacation pay
53 Id. 191.
541d.
55 Id.
56 This article does not attempt to survey the view of the law as it exists in the
various circuit courts of appeal. For compilations of how the courts have handled
claims of breach of the duty of fair representation, see R. Gomfn , BAsic TEXT oN
LABOR LAw: UNiousAnoN AND CoLr.ncnv BA GAINn 695-728 (1976); Koretz
& Rabin, Arbitration and Individual Rights, in THE FuTuRE OF LABOR A-BrHATION
rN A.mERICA 113 (J. Correge, V. Hughes & M. Stone eds. 1976); Tobias, supra note
26; Comment, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX.
L. REv. 1119 (1973).
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clearly required by a multiple-employer contract. The drivers
repeatedly complained to the union, but the business agent
refused to take any action. His only excuse was that the em-
ployer claimed that he could not afford to pay more.
The union here, by refusing to process grievances, has effec-
tively set aside a provision of the collective agreement. When the
agreement was made, the union had the fullest freedom to negotiate
terms it believed were in the best interests of the employees. That
agreement has been ratified by established procedures, and it has
created legal rights and duties in the employees, as well as in the
union and in the employers. Now a union officer has cast aside that
negotiation and ratification process as an empty exercise and seeks
to treat the contract as consisting of paper promises.
Such a cavalier treatment of the contract is scarcely consistent
with the contemplation of the parties and seems contrary to the union
members' understanding and expectations when they ratified the con-
tract.57 The expectation of the employees was that they would be
paid the rates promised in the contract, not something less later
deemed adequate by the business agent. Those expectations are
rooted in legal rights. As the Court held in Smith v. Evening News
Association,58 the collective agreement created legal rights in the
employees that they be paid in accord with its terms. The only
thing standing in the way of their legally enforcing those rights is
the union's assertion of exclusive control over the enforcement pro-
cedure and its refusal to use that procedure on the employees' be-
half. As the Court said in Vaca, Congress did not intend "to confer
upon unions such unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees
of all remedies for breach of contract." 59
Congress has further affirmed that unions should not treat con-
tracts they negotiate so lightly, and that employees should be able
57 In most unions, the process for union ratification of agreements differs mark-
edly from the process for the settlement of grievances. Ratification is normally by
a special process maximizing membership participation, either through referendum
vote or approval by a specially selected bargaining committee or representative body.
Ratification votes often generate heated debates and large membership turnout, with
the recommended agreement being rejected in about 10% of the cases and union
negotiators being required to bargain further to obtain different terms. Simkin,
Refusals to Ratify Contracts, in TRADE UNio N GovymmENT AND CoErrcv BAR-
GAnmqG: Soam CrncA. Issu s 107 (J. Seidman ed. 1970); Summers, Ratification
of Agreements, in FRONTIERS oF COLLECTIVE BARGA NG 75 (J. Dunlop & N.
Chamberlain eds. 1967). This political process of contract ratification contrasts
sharply with the essentially administrative process with which grievances are
normally handled.
58371 U.S. 195 (1962).
59 386 U.S. at 186.
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to rely upon the contract as written. Section 104 of the Landrum-
Griffin Act places on unions the duty to provide every employee,
who so requests, a copy of any collective agreement that affects
him.60 The union can scarcely discharge this duty by delivering a
document of paper promises not to be enforced. The relevance
of this section was underlined by the Third Circuit in Price v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters: "Implicit in this provision
was the assumption that absent appropriate amendment of the labor
contract, there could be no changes in the agreement that would
abrogate rights contained in it." ' The purpose of the statute was
to enable employees to know their rights under the contract; that
purpose is frustrated if they are in fact denied the rights clearly
stated in the contract.
None of the policies or values that have been articulated by
the Court weigh against the individual drivers in this case enforcing
their rights under the contract. There is no gap in the contract for
the union and the employer to fill or ambiguity for them to resolve
by negotiation and settlement through the grievance procedure; the
rates of pay are clearly prescribed. The union is not sifting out
frivolous grievances, but is ignoring a meritorious grievance. In
this case, to impose on the union the duty to enforce the drivers'
rights would not "so overburden the arbitration process as to pre-
vent it from functioning successfully," 62 but would instead require
that arbitration successfully perform its function. Indeed, if the
union could block enforcement of employee rights in these circum-
stances, "the contractual system would then cease to qualify as an
adequate mechanism to secure individual redress for damaging
failure of the employer to abide by the contract." 63
There is no practical need for the union's having the power to
nullify provisions of the contract by refusing to process grievances.
If changed circumstances require changes in the agreement, the
union and the employer can, as suggested in Price," negotiate an
amendment to the contract. Amendment, however, should be
60 The words of Section 104 are as follows:
It shall be the duty of the secretary or corresponding principal officer of
each labor organization, in the case of a local labor organization, to forward
a copy of each collective bargaining agreement made by such labor organi-
zation with any employer to any employee who requests such a copy and
whose rights as such employee are directly affected by such agreement....
29 U.S.C. §414 (1970).
61457 F.2d 605, 610 (3d Cir. 1972).
62 386 U.S. at 192.
63 424 U.S. at 571.
64 457 F.2d at 611.
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through affirmative exercise of established procedures for making
new contractual rules, not through refusal to use the procedures for
enforcing existing rules. Even beyond the frustration of the legiti-
mate expectation of union members that the union's legislative
processes be followed, there are obvious dangers if union officers or
grievance committees are allowed to set aside or ignore clear pro-
visions of the collective agreements.
The union's refusal to enforce a clear provision in the collective
agreement cuts at the very root of its duty of fair representation.
The union as representative of the employees owes to them the duty
an agent owes to his principal. How can an agent authorized to
make a contract on behalf of his principal, make the contract and
then deprive his principal of its benefits? The obligation of a
union as fiduciary should be to enforce the contract it has made on
behalf of the employees it represents. At the very least, the union
ought not play "dog in the manger" and assert its control over the
grievances so as to bar employees from enforcing the contract in
their own behalf. As the Supreme Court said in Steele, the duty
of the union "is to act for and not against those whom it
represents." 6
B. The Case of the Painful Principle
The operation of two plants of a national corporation are con-
solidated into the newer of the two plants. The national
agreement covering both plants explicitly provides that when
two plants are consolidated in this fashion, seniority shall be
governed by length of service with the company. Application
of this rule would result in almost all of the employees from
the older, abandoned plant being in the top third of the com-
bined seniority list, and all of the layoffs resulting from the
consolidation being suffered by the employees in the newer,
continuing plant. To avoid this, the local union and manage-
ment agree to slot the employees according to relative seniority
in each plant rather than by straight company seniority. This
results in the layoff of some of the employees from the older,
abandoned plant. When they file grievances, the local union
refuses to process the grievances and the international union
refuses to intervene.
When the union negotiated the national agreement, it had the
fullest freedom to negotiate rules governing merger of seniority lists
65 323 U.S. at 202.
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when plants consolidated. The union chose and established by
agreement the rule of dovetailing according to company seniority
and that agreement has been ratified and is legally binding. The
union now seeks to set aside that rule in a particular case and work
a result contrary to the contract.
As in the preceding case, the union's refusal to enforce clear
provisions in the contract violates its obligation to represent em-
ployees who have legal rights under the contract. In more basic
terms, the union's action here is "arbitrary" in the most fundamental
meaning of that word-not being governed by rule or principle. 6
The arbitrariness is not in the particular result, removed from its
context, for relative seniority would be a rational rule for merging
seniority lists. The arbitrariness of the result lies in its violation
of the very rule established to govern the case. As the Eighth
Circuit said in Butler v. Local 823, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, a similar case: "[T]he Local . . . breached its duty to
insist that the Employer adhere to the contract, and . . . acquiesced
in an irrational interpretation of the contract, thereby discrim-
inating against Butler [the employee]." 67
The union's refusal to follow the contractual rule is arbitrary
in the same sense that an employer would be arbitrary in discharg-
ing an employee for an offense when the posted rule stated a max-
imum penalty of three months suspension. It is arbitrary in the
same sense that a union would be arbitrary in disqualifying a
candidate for union office on grounds not stated in the constitution
or generally applied. It is arbitrary in the same sense that an
administrative agency would be arbitrary in refusing to apply its
published rules in a particular case.
If the collective agreement contains no provision on how
seniority lists shall be merged when plants are consolidated, the
union and employer can fill the gap by agreeing on any result
within "the wide range of reasonableness" applicable to negotiating
new terms. On the other hand, when the contract establishes rules,
the refusal to follow those rules can only be described as arbitrary.
For the union to reject a grievance that correctly protests a violation
of the contract is for it to "arbitrarily ignore a meritorious
grievance."
Again, the union can negotiate an amendment to the contract
and establish a different rule if experience shows that the existing
60 BLACk's LAw DicoNARY 134 (4th ed. 1968) defines arbitrary as "fixed or
done capriciously or at pleasure; without adequate determining principle; . . . not
governed by any fixed rules or standard."
67514 F.2d 442, 454 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
1977]
268 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
rule works undesired results; but it should do so through procedures
appropriate for making contract rules, not by refusing to enforce
existing rules in the particular case. The new contract rule should
be applicable only prospectively to future consolidations, for to
make it effective retroactively to grievances already filed would not
only defeat the matured expectations of the employees but would
give it an element of arbitrariness.
C. The Case of the Settled Ambiguity
Two companies governed by the same multiple-employer con-
tract merge. The contract language is ambiguous, but the
consistent practice in similar cases has been to dovetail seniority
lists. Union officials, responding to the majority views of the
employees involved, agree with the employer that the employees
of the smaller, absorbed company should go to the foot of the
seniority list. Employees who are laid off-all former em-
ployees of the smaller, absorbed company-object, but their
grievances are rejected by the union-employer joint committee.
This case is basically no different from the two preceding
cases. Although the words of the contract are ambiguous, its mean-
ing has become settled by past practice. 8 The parties, in disposi-
tion of prior cases, have reached a mutual understanding as binding
as if it were clearly stated in the printed words. There is no longer
an ambiguity, but an established rule. Refusal to follow the estab-
lished rule in the particular case is arbitrary in the fundamental
meaning of the word.
Until the ambiguity is resolved, the parties are free to agree to
any interpretation that is within the range of the ambiguity. For
instance, had there been no prior cases of consolidation and no rel-
evant past practice, the decision to endtail the seniority lists would
not violate the union's duty of fair representation. The court will
not substitute its interpretation for that of the parties so long as
their interpretation meets the Humphrey standard that the contract
provision "reasonably meant what the Joint Committee said or
68 Recognized rules of contract construction direct that ambiguities in the parties'
agreement be read in light of performance as well as in light of custom. A. CoRBN,
Coannr oN CoTrrAcrs §§ 101, 556 (1963) (effect of subsequent action by the
parties; proof of usage and custom to add provisions to a contract). Indeed, in the
area of commercial contracts these rules have been given the force of statute. U.C.C.
§§ 1-205, 2-208 (course of dealing and usage of trade; course of performance or
practical construction). For a general discussion of the applicability of contract
principles to collective bargaining agreements, see Summers, Collective Agreements
and the Law of Contracts, 78 YAL, LJ. 525 (1969).
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assumed it meant." 60 In resolving ambiguities or filling gaps, the
parties are completing their contract, not changing it. This can be
done through the grievance procedure, for settlement of issues left
unresolved or partially resolved during negotiations is one of the
major functions of the grievance procedure. Unresolved ambigu-
ities do not create defined contract rights and employee expectations
are not defeated by the resolution of ambiguities within the range
of reasonable interpretations.
In contrast, when the parties have resolved the ambiguity, and
by their grievance settlements have established a rule, the policies
of Vaca come to bear. Among those policies is that "similar com-
plaints will be treated consistently" and that individual grievants
[will] not be subject to "the vagaries of independent and un-
systematic negotiation." 70 These policies can be fulfilled only if
the union follows its own precedents and settles grievances in ac-
cordance with established rules.
That the union responded in the present case to majority pres-
sure in endtailing employees from the smaller company does not
justify the union's action, but makes it more vulnerable. As the
Court said in Steele, the union "is to represent all its members, the
majority as well as the minority." 71 The duty to represent equally
the interests of the minority limits the legitimizing force of majority
rule, for as emphasized by courts of appeal "[I]t is not proper for a
bargaining agent in representing all of the employees to draw dis-
tinctions among them which are based upon their political power
within the union." 72 When there is a direct clash of interests be-
tween two groups of employees, as in the present case, submission
of the issue to majority vote may lead to the conclusion that the
09 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 345 (1964). The majority of the Court
implicitly rejected Mr. Justice Goldberg's argument that the parties were free to
amend the contract by settlement of a grievance, and that an individual employee
could not complain because a grievance settlement was not within the confines of
the contract. As was said in Price v. Teamsters, "The majority adopted a more
traditional approach and required the parties to operate within the confines of the
collective bargaining agreement." The union's action was upheld "only after making
a determination that the interpretation involved was reasonable in the light of the
contractual language." 457 F.2d at 610.
70 386 U.S. at 191.
71 323 U.S. at 202.
72 Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961)
(allegation that union favored politically strong local over politically weak local).
See also O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 407 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1969),
aff'd on other grounds, Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Mount v. Grand
Int'l Bhd. Loc. Eng'rs., 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955).
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decision is not based on legitimate considerations, but on political
power, and is therefore arbitrary and discriminatory.73
D. The Case of Grievance Horsetrading
Two discharge cases were pending arbitration. Olsen, who
was 55 years old, a warehouse worker, and a former union
officer, was discharged for intoxication on the job. The evi-
dence against him seemed overwhelming and this was his third
offense, but the union committee demanded arbitration be-
cause, in their terms, "this is the last thing we can do for Ollie."
Schmidt, a truck driver, was discharged for refusing to take out
a truck on an assigned load, claiming that the truck was in bad
repair and was overloaded. Union investigation had found
that the brakes were defective and the load was 10,000 pounds
above the legal limits. A week before the scheduled arbitration
the company offered to reinstate Olsen if the union would
withdraw the Schmidt grievance. The union committee
agreed.
This case is but one variation of grievance horsetrading, a prac-
tice based on the assumption that the union owns the grievance and
is free to trade one grievance for another to gain what it considers
is a net advantage. The union, however, does not own the griev-
ance, for the individual employee acquires legal rights under the
collective agreement, and the union is the employee's agent to en-
force those rights. In the present case, both Olsen and Schmidt had
legal rights not to be discharged without just cause, and the union
had a duty to each of them. That duty, under Vaca, was to, "in a
non-arbitrary manner, make decisions as to the merits of particular
grievances" 74and not to ignore meritorious grievances. The union
here surrendered Schmidt's right to a job, not because it judged his
grievance to be without merit, but because it sought a benefit for
Olsen. The union has not represented Schmidt's interests, but has
abandoned them; it has not acted for him, but against him."5 It is
difficult to understand how the union in this case could straight-
facedly assert that it has represented Schmidt fairly and equally. To
sustain such grievance trading would lead to the result decried in
73 NLRB v. General Truck Drivers Local 315, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976);
Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLBB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
74386 U.S. at 194.
75 In Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976), such trading of discharge grievances was characterized
as "arbitrary," and a violation of the duty of fair representation.
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Hines: "Wrongfully discharged employees would be left without
jobs and without a fair opportunity to secure an adequate
remedy." 76
A closely related variation of horsetrading was involved in
Local 13, ILWU v. Pacific Maritime Association,77 where the union
accepted the employer's deregistration of a longshoreman in return
for the employer's granting a grievance concerning the packing of
sacks. The rationale of the union was that the trade resulted in
the greater good for the greater number because the deregistration
involved only one man and sack-packing involved a large number.
The response of the court of appeals was blunt: "[T]he deliberate
sacrifice of a particular employee as a consideration for other ob-
jectives must be a concession the union cannot make." 78
The union's violation of its duty in these cases is that its de-
cision to surrender the individual's grievance was not based on a
judgment of the merits of the grievance. If a union, after full in-
vestigation and fair consideration, decides that a grievance is not
worth carrying to arbitration, then in such a case there would be no
unfairness to the individual employee in its trading surrender of
his grievance for whatever favorable settlements of other grievances
it might persuade the employer to give.
Grievance trading is sometimes done in the bulk where a large
number of grievances are awaiting arbitration. The employer
may agree to grant a number of grievances in return for the union's
agreement to withdraw the rest. Among those withdrawn may be
grievances of individuals claiming misclassification, lay off out of
line seniority, wrongful denial of promotion, or improper dis-
cipline. If the union has evaluated each of the withdrawn griev-
ances and duly judged that they lack sufficient merit to go to arbi-
tration, then no serious problem of fairness is posed, for the union's
action serves the legitimate purpose recognized in Humphrey to
"sift out wholly frivolous grievances which would only clog the
grievance process." 79 The individuals whose grievances are sur-
rendered have no cause for complaint if the union succeeds in
trading off grievances it would never have processed further in the
first instance. However, this is often not the case. The union may
not be sifting out wholly frivolous grievances, but rather withdraw-
ing grievances that it believes have merit or that it has not suffi-
ciently investigated to make a judgment.
76424 U.S. at 571.
77441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1971).
78 Id. 1068.
79 375 U.S. at 349.
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In analytical terms, such grievance settlements in bulk are the
rankest form of arbitrary and discriminatory conduct. The settle-
ment is arbitrary in that the established rules are set aside, and the
grievances are not decided on their merits but on a wholly un-
principled basis. The grievances are settled because, by happen-
stance, they are in the backlog when the settlement is made. The
settlement is discriminatory in that these particular employees are
treated differently from other employees; they are not given equal
protection, for the protection of their individual contract rights is
abandoned in order to benefit others. The union's fiduciary ob-
ligation, at the very least, is to make a good faith judgment of the
merits of the individual's grievance, not to conduct a lottery with
his livelihood.
Such bulk settlements may be useful in relieving grievance
procedures which have become overburdened at the final steps, but
this does not justify wholesale abandonment of employees' rights.
Such backlogs do not grow overnight, but are the result of one or
both parties' refusing to settle at lower steps of the grievance pro-
cedure or to press forward at upper steps. The parties can not
fairly assert exclusive control over procedures to enforce the contract
and then shift the burden of their failure properly to use that
procedure onto randomly designated employees and make them pay
with loss of their job rights. This is an arbitrary and discriminatory
imposition on a few employees of the costs of the parties' past
failures. The union should not so readily escape its responsibility
to aggrieved employees to weigh the merits of the grievances and to
seek settlement of those grievances on their merits, nor should the
employer so readily escape its liability for breaches of the collective
agreement.
E. The Case of Sudden Statesmanship
Pulaski was discharged for striking a foreman. Pulaski claimed
that the foreman had provoked him with obscene and abusive
language containing ethnic slurs. The foreman claimed that
Pulaski started the verbal abuse and shoving match. The
union refused to carry the case to arbitration because it be-
lieved that there was little chance of winning Pulaski's rein-
statement and it did not want to condone fighting. In the
past, however, the union had carried every discharge case to
arbitration, no matter how questionable, including fighting
cases. Even in some seemingly hopeless cases, the arbitrator
had ordered reinstatement without back pay.
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The definition of "discriminate" is to treat unequally; and the
union's duty of fair representation, as articulated in Steele and sub-
sequent cases, is to "protect equally" all those it represents. Here,
Pulaski has been discriminated against because he has not been
given equal protection by the union; he has been denied access to
the arbitration process previously enjoyed by others similarly
situated. He has thereby been denied a chance given to other
discharged employees to win a reduced penalty, a chance of sub-
stantial value even if it is only a spin on the roulette wheel of
arbitration.
The union, of course, cannot be permanently locked into a duty
to arbitrate all discharge cases of this type because of its past policy;
the union must be free to change that policy. Fairness, it seems to
me, requires, however, that a change of policy should be made by
prospective rule rather than by application in a particular case that
arises before the decision to change is made. Refusing to proceed
in the particular case, rather than adopting a prospective rule, not
only defeats the expectations of the employee, but also presents the
risk that the change will not be made in future cases and that the
purported rule is no rule at all.80 The standard of fairness sug-
gested here is similar to the standard of fairness imposed on em-
ployers in discipline cases-past toleration of violations of even a
posted rule may bar discipline until after the employer has given
notice that in the future such violations will not be tolerated.$'
A reverse problem is presented when the union refuses to
process a meritorious grievance because the union lacks the re-
sources or decides that the grievance is not worth the cost. Cer-
tainly, the union cannot be expected to carry every meritorious
grievance to arbitration, for a grievance may be frivolous because
of triviality as well as lack of merit.8 2 Furthermore, union mem-
80 The usual policies weighing against allowing individuals to insist on arbitra-
tion do not apply here. No problem of interpretation to be resolved by the parties
is involved. The grievance procedure will not be substantially burdened, for there
need be only one more case, and of the kind the parties have regularly arbitrated in
the past. The union is free to adopt for the future a policy of not arbitrating
grievances which have little chance of success.
81 The requirement that the union's policy of not carrying all discharge cases to
arbitration be prospective only is not to provide notice to the employees, for an
employee can scarcely claim he engaged in misconduct justifying discharge in reliance
on the union's taking his case to arbitration. Requiring the policy to be prospective
is to insure that the change is genuinely one of policy and not one motivated by
and limited to the immediate case.
82 The union's decision should appropriately take into account both the value of
the grievance to the employee if the arbitration is successful, and the likelihood that
the arbitration 'will be successful. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192-93 (1967);
Encina v. Tony Lama Boot Co., 448 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1971); Curth v. Faraday,
Inc., 401 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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bers may refuse to assess themselves dues sufficient to arbitrate even
substantial grievances. However, it is one thing for a union to
declare an inability or unwillingness to process a meritorious griev-
ance, and quite another thing for a union to bar the individual
from processing it on his own behalf. The union's exclusive con-
trol over grievances is not one imposed on the union by the statute,
but is one voluntarily assumed by the union under the contract.
The union's duty of fair representation would seem to preclude
it from preempting enforcement of individuals' rights under the
collective agreement when it lacks the ability to perform that func-
tion. At least where substantial grievances are involved, fair repre-
sentation should require the union either to enforce the contract
or to allow the individual to enforce the contract on his own
behalf 83
F. The Case of the Unloved Grievant
"Bull Whip Pete" had been promoted to supervisor from the
ranks, but after several years he became so abusive and over-
bearing that he could not work with the men under him.
When he was demoted back to the bargaining unit, he bid on a
job based on seniority accumulated during the years he worked
as a supervisor. The company awarded him the job but when
the union protested, the company removed him from the job.
The contract language was ambiguous as to accumulation of
seniority by supervisors and there were no precedents. The
union committee refused to process his grievance, stating, "He
should be ridden out of the plant on a rail."
Two compelling considerations meet here head-on. On the
one hand, the contract is ambiguous and the parties should be
allowed to resolve that ambiguity. At the bargaining table the
contract was left incomplete, failing to specify the rule to govern
this case; the grievance procedure has provided the parties no prior
opportunity to complete their contract. They should now be free to
complete their contract by agreeing to whatever reasonable inter-
pretation best serves their mutual interests and establishing a rule
83 When the individual has a valuable interest at stake, such as in a discharge
case, the union could offer to take the case to arbitration on the condition that the
employee pay the costs. See Encina v. Tony Lama Boot Co., 448 F.2d 1264 (5th
Cir. 1971). The union's failure to do this would seem to raise questions of good
faith as to its claim that its refusal to proceed was because the case was not worth
the cost.
If the employee pays for the arbitration and it is successful, he should be entitled
to reimbursement by the union, for he has vindicated his claim that the case was
worth the cost.
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to govern this and future cases. This freedom should be as wide
as the ambiguity in the contract, and might well encompass the
result reached in this case.
On the other hand, the union, in settling Pete's grievance was
motivated by personal hostility which generates arbitrariness and
bespeaks bad faith. The union did not act for but against one
whom it was obligated to represent, seeking to destroy rather than
to protect his contractual rights. In this respect, the case is a
paradigm of the failure to represent fairly.
84
The grievance settlement here cannot claim validity as an act
of contract completion, for the parties did not weigh the considera-
tions as to whether a general rule allowing accumulation of seniority
during service as a supervisor would serve their mutual interests.
Indeed, it is doubtful if they intended to establish a general rule to
govern future cases. Nonetheless, if no personal hostility had been
involved, and they had made a good faith judgment on the merits,
they might well have arrived at the same result. Pete has not neces-
sarily been deprived of any substantive contract right to accu-
mulated seniority; he has clearly been deprived of a procedural
right to a fair determination.
Given the patent bad faith of the union in this case, there can
be no dispute that Pete has been deprived of his right to fair repre-
sentation and is entitled to legal relief. The problem is to design a
remedy that will not unduly impair the parties' freedom to complete
the contract by agreeing to a general rule to govern future cases,
but that will give Pete a fair determination of his grievance in the
particular case. Wrestling with the slippery and entangling prob-
lems of remedies is beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to
say that there are a range of alternatives, one of which is for the
court to make the determination, as it can under Vaca, with the
explicit statement that the court's decision in the particular case
shall not be a binding precedent preventing the parties from adopt-
ing a different rule in future cases.85
G. The Case of the Careless Committeeman
Murphy was discharged for theft of company property. He
protested his innocence and, following established practice,
filled out a grievance form, signed it, and gave it to his shop
84 See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 485, IUE, 454 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1972); Miranda
Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
85 Ordering the parties to reprocess the grievance would only cast the grievant
back into the lion's den, and ordering arbitration would give the grievant less than
full assurance of fairness if the arbitrator is selected by the parties.
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committeeman. The committeeman lost the form and forgot
to do anything about it. Murphy assumed that the grievance
was being held pending the criminal proceedings. A year
later, after he was acquitted by a jury, Murphy discovered that
the union had never filed the grievance. He filed a new
grievance, which the union carried to arbitration, but the
arbitrator dismissed the grievance as not timely.
The duty of fair representation, as stated in Steele, is rooted in
the basic proposition that the union, in exercising its power to act
on behalf of the employee, owes a fiduciary duty to protect the
employee's interests. The union, as fiduciary, is entrusted with
enforcing the employee's rights under the contract; certainly, it must
owe the duty of reasonable care not to default those rights by failing
to file the grievance. The union's position in this respect is
analogous to that of a lawyer who is retained to enforce a claim, and
like a lawyer the union should be liable for negligence that results
in loss of that claim. The union can scarcely assert that it has
fulfilled the duty to represent fairly when, by its negligence, it has
failed to represent at all.
The Court, in Vaca, elaborated on the union's duty in griev-
ance handling, saying: "[A] union can not arbitrarily ignore a
meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion." s6
How can the union meet the standard of processing the grievance
in more than a perfunctory manner when it has negligently failed
to process it at all? As the Sixth Circuit said in Ruzicka v. General
Motors Corp.:
[W]hen a union makes no decision as to the merit of an
individual's grievance but merely allows it to expire by
negligently failing to take a basic and required step toward
resolving it, the union has acted arbitrarily and is liable
for a breach of its duty of fair representation. 7
The union's negligence may take the form of inadequate in-
vestigation or presentation of the grievance, leading the union to
withdraw a meritorious grievance or lose it in arbitration. For
example, in Minnis v. U.A.W.,s8 an employee was discharged for
falsifying a medical form. An alteration was apparent on the face
86 386 U.S. at 191.
87523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975). For similar cases, see Day v. UAW
Local 36, 466 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1972); Boone v. Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d
285 (5th Cir. 1967).
88531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975).
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of the form and the union dropped the grievance without investi-
gating the employee's claim that the alteration was made by the
doctor's nurse. The union's failure to make this investigation, said
the court, was a violation of its duty to represent the employee.
Similarly, in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,9 the local union lost
a discharge grievance before the joint area committee because it
had failed to investigate the employees' claim that they had not
falsified their receipts, but that the motel clerk had falsified the
motel records.
The union, acting as a fiduciary representing the employees in
enforcing their rights under the contract, owes a duty to use reason-
able care to investigate the grievance. To settle the grievance, or
to present it to arbitration without making reasonable efforts to
investigate it is, in the words of Vaca, to "process it in perfunctory
fashion." 90
Requiring a union to use reasonable care in filing, investigat-
ing, and processing grievances places a substantial burden on the
union. However, the burden of reasonable care is borne by every
union member who drives a car, every union that owns a union hall,
every agent who undertakes a task, and every lawyer who accepts a
client. At a minimum a union owes the same duty of reasonable
care to those it represents as persons generally owe to strangers, and
its special status vis-4-vis employees further imposes upon it the
duty of reasonable care a fiduciary owes to the persons on whose
behalf he acts.91
89424 U.S. 554 (1976).
DO 386 U.S. at 191. In De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabaiadores Packinghouse,
AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970), the
union failed to press the grievances of six discharged employees because of a good
faith but mistaken belief that they would be reinstated by the NLBE. The court
held that this amounted to arbitrary and perfunctory processing of the grievances.
In Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), the union filed its grievance
through the management official with whom the grievant had engaged in a fight that
led to his discharge. The union's using this channel when another was available
was termed "the equivalent of arbitrarily ignoring the grievance or handling it in a
perfunctory manner." Id. 184.
91 What constitutes "reasonable care' varies according to the relationship, if
any, existing between the parties. The traditional tort duty of reasonable care is
essentially negative in character in that it is breached only through affirmative mis-
conduct--"misfeasance"-and not through failure to act--nonfeasance." W. PliossER,
THE LAw OF ToRTs § 56 (4th ed. 1971). Affirmative duties arise between parties
as a function of special relationships, however, and in their presence, nonfeasance is
a basis for liability. Id.; see, e.g., REsrATEmNT (SxcorD) OF AGENcy § 379 (1957)
(duty of care and skill); A. ScoTT, THE LAw OF TRusTs §§ 174-85 (3d ed. 1967)
(duty to exercise reasonable care and skill and other affirmative duties of trustees).
The fiduciary nature of the union-employee relationship imposes on the union an
affirmative duty of reasonable care in the investigation and processing of an em-
ployee's grievance, and nonfeasance, such as a failure to adequately investigate a
grievance, may constitute a breach of this duty.
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A union's failure to exercise reasonable care in grievance
handling should be considered a violation of its duty of fair repre-
sentation for two reasons. First, the union has voluntarily assumed,
if not aggressively sought, the authority to represent the employees.
Having acquired the statutory authority, it has voluntarily expanded
that authority by negotiating contractual provisions giving it ex-
clusive control over grievances. It has, thereby, barred the em-
ployee from processing his own grievance or suing the employer to
enforce his contractual rights. Having commandeered control over
the employee's rights under the contract, the union should owe at
least the duty to use reasonable care in enforcing those rights.
Second, the employer, by giving the union exclusive control over
grievances, has insulated himself from the employee's suit unless
the union has violated its duty of fair representation. An employer
who has wrongfully discharged an employee should not escape
liability because of the union's negligence. This would leave the
employee who was a victim of two wrongs, one by the union and
one by the employer, wholly remediless.
The standard of reasonable care is, of course, a flexible one;
here, as elsewhere, it must be shaped to conform to the special needs
and character of the situation and the nature of the relationship
between the parties. This means it should take into account, among
other things, the special nature of union organization, the cus-
tomary practices in grievance handling, the kinds of cases being
handled, the expectations of the employees, and the fiduciary status
of the union. The union, in administering the agreement, must do
more than avoid dishonesty, arbitrariness, discrimination, and bad
faith. It has voluntarily assumed the exclusive responsibility and
authority to enforce the employees' rights under the contract; its
duty of care in representing the employees should be commensurate
with that fiduciary responsibility and authority.
V. EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
These seven sample cases do not purport to cover the full
spectrum of problem situations nor suggest the multitude of fact
variations which arise. They are intended only to provide points
of focus for applying the general guides and principles articulated
by the Supreme Court to concrete fact situations. Reflection on
these cases, however, does lead us to some more explicit standards
for measuring the individual employee's rights under the collective
agreement and the union's duty to represent the employee in en-
forcing the agreement. Six standards emerge quite clearly.
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1. The individual employee has a right to have clear and un-
questioned terms of the collective agreement that have been made
for his benefit, followed and enforced until the agreement is prop-
erly amended. For the union to refuse to follow and enforce the
rules and standards it has established on behalf of those it repre-
sents is arbitrary and constitutes a violation of its fiduciary
obligation.
2. The individual employee has no right to insist on any par-
ticular interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a collective
agreement, for the union must be free to settle a grievance in
accordance with any reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous
provision. However, the individual has a right that ambiguous
provisions be applied consistently and that the provision mean the
same when applied to him as when applied to other employees.
Settlement of similar grievances on different terms is discrim-
inatory and violates the union's duty to represent all employees
equally.
3. The union has no duty to carry every grievance to arbitra-
tion; the union can sift out grievances that are trivial or lacking in
merit. However, the individual's right to equal treatment includes
equal access to the grievance procedure and arbitration for similar
grievances of equal merit.
4. The individual employee has a right to have his grievance
decided on its own merits. The union violates its duty to represent
fairly when it trades an individual's meritorious grievance for the
benefit of another individual or of the group. Majority vote does
not necessarily validate grievance settlements, but may instead, make
the settlement suspect as based on political power and not the
merits of the grievance.
5. Settlement of grievances for improper motives such as per-
sonal hostility, political opposition, or racial prejudice constitutes
bad faith regardless of the merit of the grievance. The union
thereby violates its duty to represent fairly by refusing to process
the grievance even though the employer may not have violated the
agreement.
6. The union can make good faith judgments in determining
the merits of a grievance, but it owes the employees it represents
the duty to use reasonable care and diligence both in investigating
grievances in order to make that judgment, and in processing and
presenting grievances on their behalf.
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These standards are obviously not exhaustive, and they lack
definitive precision. They do, however, carry us a substantial step
beyond the general guides and principles as stated in Humphrey v.
Moore, Vaca v. Sipes and Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight. They
give us a more meaningful understanding of the nature and content
of the duty of fair representation and provide more workable guides
for deciding concrete cases. Together, they protect the individual's
right to representation in grievance handling, and, at the same
time, allow the union sufficient freedom to fulfill its function in
administering the agreement.
